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Summary
•	 The	 analysis	 of	Gazprom’s	 financial	 condition	 is	 hindered	 by	 the	way	 in	
which	it	prepares	its	reports.	Gazprom’s	financial	reports	have	been	drawn	
up	for	the	entire	Gazprom	Group,	in	which	two	Gazprom-controlled	com-
panies,	Gazpromneft	and	the	electricity	holding	Gazprom	Energoholding,	
make	a	significant	contribution	to	 the	Group’s	high	sales	figures	(in	2017	
they	accounted	for	37%	of	the	Group’s	turnover	and	around	42%	of	its	gross	
revenues).
•	 An	 analysis	 of	 the	 Russian	 gas	 giant’s	 fundamental	 indices	 shows	 that	
Gazprom	is	in	a	relatively	stable	financial	condition.	The	company’s	balance	
sheet	is	fundamentally	positive;	its	non-current	assets	are	fully	covered	by	
its	equity	and	non-current	liabilities.	The	company	has	been	regularly	re-
porting	increasing	turnover	(sales),	and	its	net	cash	from	operating	activi-
ties	is	positive.	
•	 On	the	other	hand,	however,	the	dynamics	of	some	important	parameters	
are	unfavourable	for	Gazprom.	Its	non-current	liabilities	have	been	rising	
faster	than	its	equity.	While	turnover		has	been	growing,	the	cost	of	goods	
sold	(operating	expenses)	has	also	been	increasing.	A	clearly	unfavourable	
tendency	is	visible	in	the	company’s	cash	flows.	Liquidity	and	profitability	
indexes	have	been	falling.	The	net	cash	from	(used	in)	financing	activities	
was	negative	in	the	period	2012–16,	and	its	rise	in	2017	was	due	to	Gazprom	
obtaining	new	loans	and	credits	(whose	share	in	the	investment	budget	ex-
ceeded	30%	for	the	first	time	in	the	company’s	history	as	a	result).	
•	 The	worsening	financial	performance	is	a	consequence,	on	the	one	hand,	of	
developments	on	external	markets,	and	on	the	other,	the	fact	that	Gazprom	
is	being	used	instrumentally	in	the	pursuit	of	Russia’s	foreign	policy	objec-
tives.	However,	unless	 special	 circumstances	arise,	 such	as	a	new	global	
financial	 crisis,	 a	 substantial	 toughening	 of	 the	 sanctions	 imposed	 on	
Gazprom	by	the	United	States	(which	is	very	unlikely	to	happen)	and	the	
European	Union	(which	is	practically	impossible),	the	company’s	financial	
situation	will	remain	stable	in	the	coming	years.	
•	 Even	if	the	unfavourable	dynamic	of	the	company’s	key	financial	indexes	
persists,	this	will	have	only	a	limited	impact	on	the	implementation	of	its	
strategic	investment	projects,	particularly	the	export	gas	pipelines.	The	ac-
tivities	of	Gazprom	as	a	state-owned	gas	company	are	oriented	primarily	
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towards	the	achievement	of	the	state’s	economic	and	political	interests,	but	
this	also	means	that	the	company	can	count	on	financial	and	administra-
tive	support	from	the	Russian	government,	which	private	companies	oper-
ating	on	purely	market	terms	would	never	be	offered.
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IntroductIon
In	2018	Gazprom,	Russia’s	biggest	state-controlled	gas	company,	adopted	 the	
largest	investment	programme	in	its	history.	The	year	before,	it	had	reported	
its	highest	ever	revenue	from	the	sale	of	gas	and	other	goods	and	services.	At	
the	same	time,	however,	in	the	period	between	2007	and	2017,	the	company’s	
capitalisation	fell	to	less	than	a	sixth,	and	in	2017	its	total	debt	reached	a	record	
level	of	US$55.2	billion.	It	is	therefore	worth	taking	a	closer	look	at	the	finan-
cial	condition	of	Russia’s	largest	gas	company,	which	remains	a	major	gas	sup-
plier	to	Europe,	accounting	for	34%	of	the	EU	market	in	2017.	
The	purpose	of	the	present	report	is	to	examine	Gazprom’s	financial	condition	
by	looking	at	its	balance	sheet,	i.e.	by	analysing	the	structure	of	its	assets	and	
capital	(changes	in	assets	and	liabilities),	its	income	statement-profit	and	loss	
account,	and	its	cash	flows.	The	report	also	discusses	the	company’s	rising	debt	
and	falling	capitalisation.	Finally,	it	offers	an	assessment	of	the	consequences	
of	Gazprom’s	financial	condition	for	the	implementation	of	its	infrastructure	
projects	and	an	attempt	at	a	forecast.	
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I. Group statIstIcs: the specIal nature 
of Gazprom’s fInancIal reportInG 
The	 assessment	 of	 Gazprom’s	 financial	 condition	 presented	 in	 this	 paper	 is	
based	on	estimates,	because	analysing	the	company’s	official	figures	presents	
some	objective	difficulties.		Gazprom	does	regularly	publish	quarterly	and	an-
nual	financial	reports	drawn	up	in	keeping	with	the	International	Financial	
Reporting	Standards	(IFRS),	financial	reports	complying	with	the	Russian	Fi-
nancial	Reporting	Standards	(RSBU),	as	well	as	annual	reports	of	its	activities.	
However,	the	figures	in	those	reports	concern	the	so-called	Gazprom	Group,	
i.e.	a	body	of	companies	which	includes	Gazprom	as	well	as	all		its	subsidiaries	
and	associated	companies.	Two	of	them	are	particularly	important:	Gazprom-
neft,	a	subsidiary	which	is	primarily	active	in	the	oil	sector	(production,	pro-
cessing	and	sale	of	oil	&	petroleum	products)	and	Gazprom	Energoholding,	an	
energy	holding	comprising	four	subsidiaries	dealing	primarily	with	the	gen-
eration,	transmission	and	trade	of	heat	and	electricity.	
While	the	gas	sector	remains	the	principal	area	of	Gazprom	Group’s	operations,	
the	importance	of	other	sectors	has	increased	considerably	in	recent	years,	as	
illustrated	by	the	figures	on	Gazpromneft’s	and	Gazprom	Energoholding’s	share	
in	the	company’s	turnover	and	profits.	Back	in	2011,	the	two	companies	account-
ed	for	31%	of	Gazprom	Group’s	turnover,	but	by	2017	their	share	exceeded	37%.	
Their	share	in	the	Group’s	net	profit	increased	from	less	than	14%	in	2011	to	more	
than	41%	in	2017.	The	same	tendency	is	visible	in	the	figures	on	the	contribution	
to	its	overall	revenues	of	the	different	categories	of	goods	and	services	provided	
by	Gazprom	Group	 to	 its	Russian	customers.	The	share	of	 revenues	 from	gas	
sales	in	the	Group’s	total	revenues	has	fallen	in	recent	years,	from	61%	in	2011	to	
51%	in	2017.	Meanwhile,	the	share	of	petroleum	products	in	total	sale	revenues	
rose	from	z	21%	in	2011	to	26%	in	2017,	reaching	as	high	as	29%	in	2014,	while	the	
share	of	oil	and	condensate	rose	from	5%	in	2011	to	8%	in	2017.	
For	these	reasons,	the	present	report	will	analyse	Gazprom’s	financial	situa-
tion	based	on	figures	for	Gazprom	Group	excluding	Gazpromneft	and	Gazprom	
Energoholding,	which	will	allow	us	to	make	estimates	about	the	financial	con-
dition	of	Russia’s	largest	gas	company.	
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II. Gazprom’s posItIve balance sheet
Gazprom’s balance sheet, reflecting the changes in its assets and capi-
tal structure, has been relatively healthy for the last seven years.	 It	has	
complied	 with	 the	 so-called	 silver balance-sheet principle,	 which	 means	
that	non-current	assets	should	be	covered	by	fixed	capital	 (equity	plus	non-
current	liabilities).1	However,	the	fixed	capital	to	non-current	assets	ratio	has	
been	systematically	falling	in	recent	years,	declining	from	1.2	in	2015	to	a	mere	
1.1	 in	2017.	Moreover,	 the	share	of	non-current	assets	 in	total	assets	oscillat-
ed	around	80%	in	the	period	2011-17	(it	dropped	to	around	75-79%	in	2013–15	
alone).	It	should	be	noted	that	those	proportions	have	not	changed	consider-
ably	over	the	last	18	years	(non-current	assets	accounted	for	79.9%	in	2000,	for	
77.3%	in	2004,	and	for	78%	in	2008),	which	is	a	positive	factor	in	the	company’s	
financial	condition.	
However,	Gazprom	has	not	been	complying	with	the	so-called	golden balance-
sheet principle,	which	means	that	non-current	assets	should	be	covered	by	
equity.	Moreover,	 the	non-current	 assets-to-equity	 ratio	has	 been	 regularly	
falling	in	recent	years:	in	2013	it	was	0.97,	and	in	2017	it	was	only	0.88.	At	the	
same	time,	Gazprom’s	non-current	liabilities	have	been	growing	more	dynam-
ically	than	its	equity.2	
Gazprom’s	current	ratio	of	liquidity	(current	assets	to	current	liabilities)	has	
remained	 at	 a	 good	 level,	 although	 in	 recent	 years	 it	 has	 shown	 a	 negative	
trend.	Gazprom’s	current	ratio	was	around	3.1	in	2010,3.86	in	2013,	and	a	mere	
1.92	in	2017.	Interestingly,	the	current	ratio	looks	much	worse	when	it	is	calcu-
lated	for	the	entire	Gazprom	Group.3	
Gazprom’s	profitability	indexes	have	also	shown	a	worrying	trend.	Its	return	
on	equity	 (which	 shows	how	much	net	 income	 the	 company’s	 equity	 gener-
ates)	fell	from	16.7%	in	2011	to	0.4%	in	2014;	in	2017	it	was	around	4.4%.	When	
1	 All	figures	analysed	in	the	text	come	from	annual	reports	published	by	Gazprom	on	the	oc-
casion	of	the	company’s	General	Meeting	of	Shareholders,	its	financial	reports	are	drawn	up	
in	accordance	with	International	Financial	Reporting	Standards	(IFRS),	and	the	aggregated	
datasets	published	on	Gazprom’s	official	website.			
2	 The	balance	sheet	indexes	do	not	change	substantially	if	the	assets	and	liabilities	of	
Gazpromneft	and	Gazprom	Energoholding	are	included	in	the	calculations.
3	 In	2010,	Gazprom	Group’s	current	ratio	was	1.85;	in	2013	it	increased	to	2.06,	and	in	2017	it	
declined	to	1.34.	An	unfavourable	dynamic	is	also	visible	in	Gazprom’s	quick	ratio.	It	was	
2.35	in	2010;	1.65	in	2013;	but	it	dropped	to	a	mere	1.04	in	2017.
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calculated	for	the	entire	Gazprom	Group,	this	index	is	slightly	higher,	20%	in	
2011	and	7%	in	2017.	An	unfavourable	trend	is	also	visible	in	Gazprom’s	return	
on	sales,	which	dropped	from	36%	in	2011	to	0.9%	in	2014	and	10.9%	in	2017,	
and	its	return	on	assets,	which	declined	from	12.9%	in	2011	to	0.3%	in	2014	and	
reached	3.1%	in	2017.	Return	on	assets	is	slightly	higher	when	calculated	for	the	
entire	Gazprom	Group:	14%	in	2011	and	4%	in	2017.	
The	decline	in	profitability	indexes	has	mainly	been	caused	by	falling	prices	on	
the	oil	and	gas	markets,	an	increase	in	fiscal	burdens,	and	a	growing	number	of	
trade	operations	with	low	profit	margins	due	to	the	consolidation	of	Gazprom’s	
trade	activities	in	Europe.	The	increase	in	the	share	of	long-term	commitments	
in	the	company’s	liabilities	and	their	rising	volume	in	recent	years	indicates	
that	Gazprom	Group	is	still	capable	of	obtaining	external	financing	for	its	ac-
tivities.	In	part,	this	is	because	the	Russian	gas	giant	has	only	been	affected	to	
a	 limited	extent	by	 the	sanctions	 imposed	on	Russia	by	Western	states.4	See	
Annex	1	for	full	information	on	the	company’s	balance	sheet.	
4	 The	EU	did	not	impose	individual	financial	or	technological	sanctions	on	Gazprom	as	a	con-
cern,	which	is	significant	as	Europe	remains	a	key	market	for	the	Russian	gas	giant.	The	fact	
that	Gazprom	was	put	on	the	US	sanctions	list	is	less	significant	because	the	Russian	com-
pany	has	only	limited	ties	to	US	businesses.	Gazpromneft	(a	company	operating	mainly	in	
the	oil	sector	and	100%	controlled	by	Gazprom)	as	well	as	Gazprombank	(a	bank	owned	by	
Gazprom)	have	been	put	on	all	the	sanctions	lists.	Sanctions	have	also	been	imposed	on	the	
Gazprom-owned	Yuzhno-Kirinskoye	gas	field	in	Sakhalin.	
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III.  the deterIoratInG Income statement 
(profIt and loss account) 
Gazprom’s situation is less optimistic when it comes to the income state-
ment (profit and loss account).	While	the	company	has	reported	rising	turn-
over	 (sales)	 in	 its	 statements	 covering	 the	entire	Gazprom	Group,	which	has	
increased	from	around	3.5	trillion	roubles	in	2010	to	more	than	6.5	trillion	rou-
bles,	i.e.	by	around	82%	in	the	period	2010–17,	Gazpromneft	and	Gazprom	Ener-
goholding	accounted	for	a	substantial	proportion	of	that	increase.	If	the	figures	
for	these	two	companies	are	excluded,	the	turnover	(sales)	of	Gazprom	and	its	
remaining	 subsidiaries	 and	 associated	 companies	 has	 risen	 from	3.2	 trillion	
to	4.1	trillion	roubles,	i.e.	by	around	28%.	Moreover,	the	increase	in	revenues	
from	sales	was	accompanied	by	an	increase	in	operating	expenses	which	ex-
ceeded	the	record	level	of	5.7	trillion	roubles	in	2017	for	the	entire	Group,	with	
Gazprom’s	 share	 in	 the	whole	 Group’s	 prime	 cost	 rising	 from	 less	 than	 59%	
in	2011	to	65.7%	in	2016	and	64%	in	2017.	The	hike	in	the	company’s	operating	
expenses	is	due	primarily	to	increased	spending	on	purchases	of	oil	and	gas,	
which	Gazprom	needed	to	make	to	meet	its	contractual	commitments	(the	value	
of	such	purchases	doubled	in	the	years	2010–17,	rising	from	605	billion	roubles	
in	2010	to	1.25	trillion	roubles	in	2017).5	The	substantial	increase	of	the	extrac-
tion	tax	(NDPI)	has	been	another	important	component	in	the	increased	oper-
ating	costs.	The	tax	rate	was	147	roubles	per	1000	m3	of	extracted	gas	in	2010,	
which	accounted	for	less	than	28%	of	the	cost	of	producing	1000	m3	of	gas,	but	
by	2017	the	basic	rate	had	risen	to	1110	roubles	per	1000	m3	of	gas,	now	account-
ing	for	nearly	57%	of	the	overall	production	cost.6	Because	of	the	above	factors,	
Gazprom’s	gross	profit	(operating	profit)	has	declined	systematically,	dropping	
from	1.4	trillion	roubles	in	2011	to	just	over	450	million	roubles	in	2016	(in	2017	
it	rose	slightly	to	500	million	roubles).	Moreover,	whereas	Gazprom	account-
ed	for	around	86%	of	Gazprom	Group’s	total	profit	in	2011,	its	contribution	had	
decreased	to	58%	by	2017,	which	once	again	demonstrates	the	growing	role	of	
Gazpromneft	and	Gazprom	Energoholding	in	generating	the	Group’s	profits.	
The	final	shape	of	Gazprom’s	profit	and	loss	account	has	also	been	influenced	
substantially	 by	 changes	 on	 the	 energy	 resource	markets	 and	 currency	 ex-
change	rate	fluctuations.	Figures	on	gas	sales	offer	a	good	illustration	of	this	
5	 Gazprom	Group	buys	gas,	oil	and	petroleum	products	in	order	to	deliver	on	some	of	its	con-
tractual	commitments	on	the	Russian	and	external	markets.
6	 While	Gazprom	demanded	a	freezing	of	the	tax	rate	at	602	roubles	per	1000	m3	in	the	period	
2014–16,	those	demands	were	not	met.	
12
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
0/
20
18
impact.	Despite	an	increase	in	the	volume	of	gas	sold	in	the	countries	of	the	so-
called		Far	Abroad	(mostly	European	buyers,	excluding	the	Baltic	states)	in	the	
period	2014–17,	the	falling	prices	caused	revenues	in	US	dollars	to	decline,	from	
US$45.4	billion	in	2014	to	US$32	billion	in	2016	(in	2017	revenues	rose	again,	
as	a	result	of	rising	oil	prices	and	the	increase	in	gas	prices	pegged	to	the	price	
of	oil).	At	the	same	time,	due	to	the	devaluation	of	the	rouble,	revenues	in	that	
currency	rose	from	2.98	trillion	roubles	in	2014	to	3.34	trillion	roubles	in	2017.7	
The	devaluation	of	 the	 rouble	 in	 relation	 to	 the	US	dollar	contributed	 to	 the	
increase	in	the	Russian	gas	giant’s	net	profit	in	2014–16.	Gains	from	currency	
exchange	 rate	 fluctuations	 amounted	 to	 around	 570	 billion	 roubles	 in	 2014,	
andto	282	billion	roubles	in	2015.		Gazprom’s	pure	profit	for	shareholders	rose	
from	around	40.6	billion	roubles	 in	2014	to	664.4	billion	roubles	 in	2015	and	
724.6	billion	roubles	in	2016;	nearly	half	of	the	2016	figure	was	attributable	to	
the	rising	exchange	rate	of	the	rouble,	which	generated	a	decrease	in	foreign	
currency	debt	as	converted	to	the	Russian	currency	(without	this	mechanism,	
the	net	profit	in	2016	would	have	fallen	by	37%	compared	to	2015).	In	2017,	profit	
dropped	again	to	414.1	billion	roubles.	See	Annex	2	for	full	information	on	the	
profit	and	loss	account.	
7	 For	the	sale	of	gas	to	former	Soviet	countries	(including	the	Baltic	states),	the	decline	in	rev-
enues	was	mainly	due	to	a	substantial	decrease	in	the	volume	of	exports,	and	partly	also	de-
clining	prices.	On	the	Russian	market,	the	growth	in	sales	revenues,	despite	a	decline	in	the	
volumes	sold,	was	a	consequence	of	rising	prices:	in	2014	the	price	of	gas	was	3500	roubles	
per	1000	m3,	and	by	2017	it	had	reached	3800	roubles	per	1000	m3.		
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Iv. neGatIve tendency In cash flows
A clearly negative tendency can be observed in Gazprom’s cash flows.	
While	the	net	cash	flow	from	operating	activities	is	positive,	its	value	has	been	
dropping	steadily	in	the	period	2015–17.	Gazprom’s	investment	spending	had	
been	 rising,	but	 in	2017	 its	value	dropped	below	 the	value	of	net	 cash	flows	
from	operating	activities	for	the	first	time.	This	was	related	to	the	company’s	
record	investment	plans	for	the	years	2018–20	(Nord	Stream	2,	TurkStream,	
Power	of	Siberia,	the	Amur	gas	processing	plant	in	the	city	of	Svobodny,	Amur	
region).	
The	company	has	been	performing	worst	in	terms	of	net	cash	from	(used	in)	fi-
nancing	activities.	Negative	results	in	the	years	2012–16	indicate	that	Gazprom	
was	 focused	on	 repaying	 its	 liabilities	 in	 that	period.	The	positive	 result	 re-
ported	in	2017	is	a	consequence	of	Gazprom	contracting	sizeable	new	loans	and	
credits.	See	Annex	3	and	5	for	a	detailed	list.
The	declining	exchange	rate	of	the	rouble	in	relation	to	the	dollar	has	not	had	
a	negative	impact	on	Gazprom’s	investment	programme	because	the	Russian	
company	covers	more	 than	70%	of	 its	 spending	 in	roubles.	Moreover,	 in	 the	
first	eight	months	of	2018	the	US	dollar’s	exchange	rate	was	below	the	value	
predicted	in	the	company’s	2018	budget.8	
8	 В.	Петлевой,	Г.	Старинская, ‘«Газпром»	планирует	рекордные	инвестиции’,	Ведомости,	
5	September	2018,		https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2018/09/05/780018-
gazprom-planiruet	
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v. mountInG debt
Gazprom Group’s total debt rose considerably in the period 2011–17, but it 
does not for now pose a risk to the company’s financial condition.	Gazprom	
Group’s	total	debt	was	worth	1536.8	billion	roubles	in	2011,	compared	to	3266.5	
billion	roubles	in	late	2017,	wherein	the	net	debt	had	risen	from	1028.2	billion	
roubles	to	2397.5	billion	roubles.	This	tendency	is	also	visible	in	the	figures	for	
the	first	half	of	2018,	with	the	total	debt	rising	to	3367.3	billion	roubles	and	the	
net	debt	to	2433.3	billion	roubles.	Gazprom	and	the	smaller	companies	it	con-
trols	account	for	most	of	the	debt	(around	75.6%);	while	Gazpromneft	accounts	
for	less	than	21%,	and	Gazprom	Energoholding	the	remainder.	
Based	on	 the	 latest	 IFRS	financial	 report	 for	 the	first	half	 of	 2018,	Gazprom	
Group’s	 debt	 including	 bonds,	 long-term	 loans	 and	 credits	 is	 worth	 around	
US$48.4	billion.9	Credits	and	bonds	in	US	dollars	account	for	nearly	32.5%	of	
that	total,	debt	in	euro	accounts	for	36.3%,	debt	in	roubles	for	around	17,5%,	and	
the	remainder	is	debt	in	other	currencies,	Swiss	francs	and	the	pound	sterling.	
In	connection	with	its	investment	plans,	Gazprom	plans	to	invest	427	billion	
roubles	as	long-term	financial	investments	(which	will	provide	around	28.5%	
of	the	investment	budget).	In	September	2018	it	was	decided	that	the	volume	of	
external	financial	borrowings	would	also	rise	to	around	518	billion	roubles,	in	
connection	with	the	expansion	of	the	investment	programme.10	
While Gazprom has not experienced problems with raising funds in re-
cent years, either in Russia or abroad, political factors and the litigations 
in which it has been involved have already started to make things more 
difficult.	The	sanctions	against	Russia	and	Russian	businesses	imposed	by	the	
United	States	and	the	European	Union	have	not	affected	Gazprom’s	financial	
situation	to	any	significant	degree.	Figures	for	the	period	from	March	2014	to	
June	2018	show	that	the	company	has	not	generally	experienced	difficulties	in	
obtaining	credits	and	loans	from	foreign	funding	sources	to	finance	its	activi-
ties.	Indeed,	Gazprom	has	issued	bonds	in	foreign	currencies	and	contracted	
credits	from	foreign	banks	(see	Annex	5	for	details).	
However,	the	impact	of	the	sanctions	and	the	litigations	in	which	it	has	been	in-
volved	have	made	it	impossible	for	Gazprom	to	implement	its	key	infra	structure	
9	 If	not	for	the	decline	in	the	rouble’s	exchange	rate	in	August	2018,	the	company’s	debt	in	US	
dollars	would	have	amounted	to	US$56.7	billion.	
10	 В.	Петлевой,	Г.	Старинская,	op. cit.		
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projects	in	line	with	the	initially	planned	model	(the	so-called	project	financ-
ing).	Such	a	mechanism	could	not	be	applied	either	to	Nord	Stream	2,11	Turk-
Stream	or	 the	Amur	Gas	Processing	Plant.	 Previously,	 the	project	financing	
model	had	allowed	Gazprom	to	successfully	carry	out	such	projects	as	Nord	
Stream	1	(with	total	external	funding	of	around	€6.4	billion),	Sakhalin	2	(total	
external	funding	US$6.7	billion)	and	the	development	of	the	Yuzhno-Russkoye	
field	(€1.1	billion).	Alternative	solutions	may	prove	costly	for	the	Russian	com-
pany,	as	demonstrated	by	its	efforts	to	raise	funds	for	the	implementation	of	the	
Nord	Stream	2	project.	Western	partners	have	extended	loans	to	the	Gazprom-
controlled	Nord	Stream	2	AG	company,	the	rouble-denominated	value	of	which	
increased	 from	 115	 billion	 to	 171	 billion	 roubles	 over	 several	months,	 due	 to	
changing	interest	rates	but	also	the	hike	of	the	euro’s	exchange	rate	in	August	
2018	(from	less	than	70	to	79	roubles).	Another	factor	impeding	the	raising	of	
funds	 on	 European	markets	 concerns	 the	 enforcement	 lawsuits	 brought	 by	
Ukraine’s	Naftohaz	in	the	aftermath	of	the	award	by	the	Arbitration	Court	in	
Stockholm.12	While	it	is	not	entirely	clear	if	and	which	Gazprom	assets	were	
frozen	at	the	request	of	the	Ukrainian	side,13	statements	by	Gazprom	officials	
suggest	that	Naftohaz’s	activities	were	the	immediate	reason	why	the	issue	of	
Gazprom’s	sterling-denominated	Eurobonds	planned	for	the	summer	of	2018	
was	cancelled.
In	the	coming	years	Gazprom	will	 face	the	additional	challenge	of	having	to	
repay	its	previously	contracted	loans.	The	maturity	dates	of	the	biggest	items	
in	 the	 company’s	 accounts	 payable	 fall	 in	 the	 years	 2018	 to	 2023,	 including	
US$12	billion	in	2018,	US$6.9	billion	in	2019	and	US$4.3	billion	in	2020.	In	re-
cent	years,	the	company’s	net	debt	to	EBITDA	ratio14	has	risen	from	0.51	in	2012	
11	 In	the	case	of	Nord	Stream	2,	the	main	obstacle	concerned	the	anti-trust	lawsuit	initiated	
by	Poland’s	Office	of	Competition	and	Consumer	Protection,	which	stopped	the	creation	of	
a	consortium	made	up	of	Gazprom	and	Western	European	companies	for	the	purposes	of	car-
rying	out	the	project,	and	prevented	the	creation	of	a	financing	mechanism.	
12	 Naftohaz	has	been	demanding	that	Gazprom	repay	its	US$2.6	billion	debt	stemming	from	
the	Russian	gas	giant’s	violation	of	the	terms	and	conditions	of	the	gas	transit	contract	con-
cluded	between	the	two	parties	in	January	2009.	
13	 According	to	media	reports,	in	enforcement	proceedings	brought	by	Naftohaz	to	courts	in	
the	United	Kingdom,	Switzerland	and	the	Netherlands,	Gazprom	assets	including	its	shares	
in	Nord	Stream	AG	and	Nord	Stream	2	AG,	Blue	Stream	Pipeline	B.V.	(the	operator	of	the	sea	
section	of	TurkStream)	Gazprom’s	shares	in	several	British	companies	were	at	least	tempo-
rarily	frozen.	
14	 EBITDA	(earnings	before	interest,	taxes,	depreciation	and	amortisation)	is	a	measure	of	
a	company’s	ability	to	repay	its	debt	from	operating	profit,	in	other	words,	it	is	a	way	of	esti-
mating	how	many	years	a	company	would	need	to	fully	repay	its	debt	from	operating	profit.	
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to	1.7	in	2017,	but	it	is	still	only	at	half	the	value	which	would	signal	excessive	
debt	(a	company	is	deemed	to	be	in	excessive	debt	with	a	ratio	of	3–3.5).	Most	
of	Gazprom’s	debt	has	maturity	dates	which	fall	within	the	next	five	years;	lia-
bilities	with	maturity	dates	beyond	five	years	account	for	only	25%	of	the	total.	
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vI. capItalIsatIon and dIvIdends
Gazprom’s market capitalisation in US dollars has  fell to one-sixth of its 
value between 2007 and 2017.	In	late	2007,	it	stood	at	a	record	level	of	US$330	
billion;	it	had	dropped	to	US$150	billion	by	December	2010,and	to	US$53.5	bil-
lion	by	December	2017.	 In	September	2018,	 the	company’s	capitalisation	was	
lower	 than	 the	 market	 capitalisation	 of	 Novatek,	 Russia’s	 largest	 private-
owned	gas	producer,	for	the	first	time	ever.15	
The	 dividend	 per	 share	 remained	 stable	 at	 7.2–8.04	 roubles	 in	 the	 period	
2013–17.	 However,	 while	 Gazprom	 does	 regularly	 pay	 out	 dividends to	 its	
shareholders,	the	rate	is	much	lower	than	the	applicable	governmental	direc-
tive	would	require.	As	per	 this	directive,	 the	company	should	be	paying	out	
50%	of	its	net	profit	calculated	in	accordance	with	the	IFRS16	(this	has	been	the	
Finance	Ministry’s	demand	in	recent	years).	However,	Gazprom	has	success-
fully	sought	derogations	from	the	rule,	and	in	recent	years	it	has	paid	out	be-
tween	20%	and	30%	of	net	profit	as	dividends	(in	2016	it	paid	out	190.33	billion	
roubles	in	dividends,	which	corresponded	to	20%	of	net	profit	as	per	the	IFRS;	
in	2017,	it	paid	190	billion	roubles,	which	corresponded	to	26.7%	of	net	profit).	
At	the	same	time,	Gazprom	remains	one	of	the	biggest	contributors	to	the	state	
budget,	with	a	total	contribution	of	around	1.3	trillion	roubles	in	2016.	The	in-
crease	of	the	NDPI	tax	rate	was	a	way	for	the	government	to	compensate	for	
lower	budget	revenues	from	the	dividends;	this	mechanism	has	also	been	good	
for	Gazprom	because	it	allows	it	to	avoid	paying	higher	dividends	to	minority	
shareholders.17	
15	 Ю.	Барсуков,	‘НОВАТЭК	обогнал	«Газпром»	по	капитализации’,	Коммерсантъ,	6	Sep-
tember	2018,	https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3733194	
16	 Pure	profit	calculated	on	the	basis	of	reports	drawn	up	in	accordance	with	the	Russian	
Financial	Reporting	Standards	(RSBU)	is	lower	than	calculated	as	per	the	IFRS.	
17	 Ю.	Барсуков,	‘Дивиденды	последней	надежды’,	Коммерсантъ,	3	September	2018,	
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3731081	
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table 1. Value of Gazprom’s dividends per share (in roubles) 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
dividends per 
share
(roubles)
3.85 8.97 5.99 7.2 7.2 7.89 8.04 8.04
proportion of 
pure profit paid 
out as dividends
(%)
9.41 16.25 11.58 14.96 107.2 23.73 20 26.65
source: Kommersant, based on figures published by Gazprom
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vII. record-breakInG Investment 
proGramme, costly Infrastructure 
projects 
In recent years, Gazprom has systematically expanded its investment pro-
gramme, which will be worth a record-breaking 1.5 trillion roubles in 2018. 
It	has	also	been	the	company’s	consistent	policy	to	increase	investment	spending	
and	exceed	the	volume	planned	for	the	given	calendar	year.	For	example,	in	2011	
the	final	value	of	the	investment	programme	was	56.4%	higher	than	originally	
planned;	in	2013	it	was	45.5%	higher,	and	in	the	years	2017	and	2018	the	original	
plans	were	exceeded	by	23.9%	and	17%	respectively.	See	Table	2	for	details.	
table 2. Gazprom’s investment programmes in the period 2009–18: plans and 
actual execution (billions of roubles)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
plans 603 802 816 776 705 806 804 842 911 1279
final value 762 905 1277 974 1026 1026 1043 853 1129 1496
Increase (%) 26.4 12.8 56.4 25.5 45.5 27.3 29.7 1.3 23.9 17
source: Vedomosti, on the basis of figures published by Gazprom
The main financial burden in the investment programmes comes from 
infrastructural projects, in particular the construction of new export 
pipelines (infrastructure spending has increased by as much as 23% in 
the expanded investment programme). In	its	annual	report,	Gazprom	has	
highlighted	 four	 infrastructure	 investments	 that	will	 be	 treated	 as	 a	 prior-
ity	in	the	coming	years,	including:	(1)	Nord	Stream	2;	(2)	the	expansion	of	the	
gas	pipeline	network	in	North-Western	Russia,	especially	the	Ukhta–Torzhok,	
Gryazovets–Slavianskaya	 and	 Bovanenkovo–Ukhta	 pipelines;	 (3)	 Power	 of	
Siberia	(the	gas	pipeline	for	exporting	Russian	gas	from	the	fields	in	Eastern	
Siberia	to	China);	(4)	the	TurkStream	gas	pipeline,	designed	to	export	Russian	
gas	to	the	Turkish	market	(the	first	branch)	and	Southern	Europe	(the	second	
branch).	Investments	in	infrastructure	development	were	also	the	main	item	
in	Gazprom’s	 investment	spending	 in	 the	period	 from	2010	to	2017.	They	ac-
counted	for	around	38%	of	total	investment	spending;	by	way	of	comparison,	
gas	extraction	projects	accounted	for	18%	of	the	total,	and	oil	and	condensate	
extraction	for	17%	of	the	total.		
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Most of the infrastructure investments currently underway are unne-
cessary from the point of view of the Russian gas giant’s current needs, 
but such investments play a role in Russia’s foreign policy, and provide 
sources of revenue for contractors and subcontractors. For	one,	the	new	gas	
pipelines	to	Europe	(Nord	Stream	2,	TurkStream)	are	not	indispensable,	given	
the	capacity	of	the	existing	infrastructure,	particularly	the	Ukrainian	transit	
route	(in	2017,	94	billion	m3	of	Russian	gas	was	transmitted	via	Ukraine,	while	
its	total	capacity	is	estimated	at	130-150	billion	m3).	Secondly,	while	the	Power	
of	Siberia	gas	pipeline	fits	in	with	Gazprom’s	strategy	to	diversify	exports,	it	is	
extremely	expensive	(the	total	cost	is	around	US$55	billion)	and,	with	the	es-
timated	low	price	of	gas	in	the	contract,	questions	remain	over	the	undertak-
ing’s	economic	viability.18	Thirdly,	even	Russian	experts	have	expressed	doubts	
about	the	future	profitability	of	the	investments	Gazprom	is	implementing,	as	
demonstrated	by	 the	 report	by	Sberbank	analysts	disclosed	 in	 June	2018	by	
Alexei	Navalny,	which	shows	that	Gazprom’s	investments	will	cost	a	total	of	
US$110	billion	over	the	next	five	years,	but	only	40%	of	that	spending	is	eco-
nomically	justified.	
18	 Questions	regarding	the	project’s	profitability	were	first	raised	upon	the	signature	of	the	
so-called	Shanghai	Contract	between	Gazprom	and	China’s	CNPC	in	May	2014.	For	more	in-
formation,	see	S.	Kardaś,	‘The	eastern	“partnership”	of	gas.	Gazprom	and	CNPC	strike	a	deal	
on	gas	supplies	to	China’,	OSW Commentary,	16	June	2014,	https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
likacje/osw-commentary/2014-06-16/eastern-partnership-gas-gazprom-and-cnpc-strike-
a-deal-gas		
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vIII. prospects
Despite	 the	 systematic	deterioration	of	many	aspects	of	Gazprom’s	financial	
performance,	no	major	threats	to	the	company’s	financial	condition	should	be	
expected	to	arise	in	the	coming	years.	The	Russian	gas	giant’s	budget	is	based	
on	 fairly	 conservative	 assumptions.	The	2018	budget	predicts	 an	 average	 oil	
price	of	US$43.8	per	barrel	(currently	the	price	exceeds	US$80)	and	a	US	dol-
lar	exchange	rate	of	64.2	roubles	(the	average	annual	exchange	rate	is	unlikely	
to	exceed	this	value).	Moreover,	 in	 the	coming	years	Gazprom	will	probably	
manage	to	keep	exports	at	the	current	level	of	180-200	billion	m3	of	gas	a	year,	
which	will	ensure	stable	revenues	from	sales	given	a	favourable	pricing	situ-
ation.	Furthermore,	Gazprom	officials	have	announced	that	once	the	2018–20	
investment	programme	is	 implemented,	the	annual	investment	budgets	will	
not	exceed	1	trillion	roubles	in	the	following	years,	 i.e.	to	2035.19	Finally,	the	
Russian	gas	giant	will	surely	be	able	to	count	on	administrative	and	financial	
support	from	the	state	in	the	basic	areas	of	its	activity,	and	especially	in	the	
implementation	of	infrastructure	projects	of	crucial	importance	for	the	state.	
SzyMon KARdAś
19	 ‘Объем	инвестпрограммы	"Газпрома"	до	2035	г	в	среднем	составит	не	более	1	трлн	руб	
в	год’,	6	February	2018,	https://1prime.ru/energy/20180206/828423151.html	
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annex 1.  Gazprom Group’s balance sheet in 2011–2017 (billions of roubles)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
a
ss
et
s (
bi
ll
io
ns
 o
f r
ou
bl
es
)
cu
rr
en
t Gazprom 
Group
2240.29 2420.80 2862.67 3461.16 3993.72 3234.35 3469.27
Gazprom 1810.34 1915.41 2301.04 2828.82 3315.30 2651.55 2852.12
no
n-
cu
rr
en
t Gazprom 
Group
8660.40 9536.03 10,573.57 11,716.31 13,058.32 13,684.59 14,769.50
Gazprom 7210.92 7973.82 8722.15 9366.48 10,352.97 10,792.90 11,519.71
li
ab
il
it
ie
s (
bi
ll
io
ns
 o
f r
ou
bl
es
)
cu
rr
en
t Gazprom 
Group
1309.25 1492.07 1391.46 1855.95 2124.7 1921.81 2589.52
Gazprom 629.48 759 596.42 1037.08 1207.86 1042.69 1480.43
no
n-
cu
rr
en
t Gazprom 
Group
1830.45 1984.82 2410.42 3201.5 4012.72 3555.29 3633.77
Gazprom 1494.80 1645.63 1944.53 2370.35 2959.59 2552.48 2688.12
eq
ui
ty
Gazprom 
Group
7760.99 8479.94 9634.36 10,120.02 10,914.62 11,441.84 12,015.48
Gazprom 6944.18 7525.14 8527.64 8787.64 9500.52 9848.77 10,202.59
n
on
-c
ur
re
nt
 a
ss
et
s
to
 e
qu
it
y Gazprom 
Group
0.89 0.89 0.91 0.86 0.84 0.84 0.81
Gazprom 0.96 0.94 0.98 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.88
to
 fi
xe
d 
ca
pi
ta
l
Gazprom 
Group
1.11 1.1 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.1 1.06
Gazprom 1.17 1.15 1.20 1.19 1.20 1.15 1.12
current 
ratio
Gazprom 
Group
1.71 1.62 2.06 1.86 1.88 1.68 1.34
Gazprom 2.87 2.52 3.86 2.73 2.74 2.54 1.92
Author’s own analysis, based on figures published in Gazprom’s annual reports and IFRS-compliant 
financial statements for the years 2011–17
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annex 2. Profit and loss account in the years 2011–17 (billions of roubles) 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
re
ve
nu
e 
(s
al
es
)* Gazprom 
Group
4637.09 4766.495 5249.965 5589.811 6073.318 6111.051 6546.143
Gazprom 3190.325 3116.799 3546.701 3734.203 4143.822 4025.993 4119.184
co
st
 o
f g
oo
ds
 
so
ld
 (o
pe
ra
ti
ng
 
ex
pe
ns
es
) Gazprom 
Group
2942.18 3421.847 3600.908 3943.669 4635.502 5244.983 5714.090
Gazprom 1754.469 2006.172 2130.673 2298.6 2943.65 3447.501 3658.135
o
pe
ra
ti
ng
 p
ro
fit
 
(g
ro
ss
 p
ro
fit
) Gazprom 
Group
1656.84 1350.68 1587.21 1310.42 1228.3 725.58 870.62
Gazprom 1424.842 1144.161 1344.344 1095.599 1004.104 446.037 503.336
pr
ofi
t b
ef
or
e 
pr
ofi
t 
ta
x
Gazprom 
Group
1679.94 1557.74 1486.08 306.82 925.24 1285.14 1018.01
Gazprom 1453.131 1347.662 1244.083 165.772 764.701 993.912 641.537
n
et
 in
co
m
e 
fo
r 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs Gazprom 
Group
1307.02 1224.47 1139.26 159.00 787.06 951.64 714.30
Gazprom 1136.201 1061.576 946.969 40.595 664.418 724.631 414.162
to
ta
l n
et
 p
ro
fit Gazprom 
Group
1342.44 1252.41 1165.70 157.19 805.20 997.10 766.88
Gazprom 1162.614 1081.15 964.179 34.174 676.99 760.588 450.511
Author’s own analysis, based on figures published in Gazprom’s annual reports and IFRS-compliant 
financial statements for the years 2011–17
* After deduction of duties and excises
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annex 3. Gazprom Group’s cash flow in the years 2011–17 
(billions of roubles)
year
net cash flows
cash at end of the 
reporting yearfrom operating 
activities
used in investing 
activities
from (used in) 
financing activities
Gazprom 
Group Gazprom
Gazprom 
Group Gazprom
Gazprom 
Group Gazprom
Gazprom 
Group Gazprom
2011 1637.45 1415.119 -1605.24 -1389.398 31.81 47.28 501.34 437.419
2012 1472.78 1178.252 -1287.22 -1018.314 -253.87 -1080.227 425.72 328.452
2013 1741.80 1411.81 -1466.51 -1143.575 -33.26 -27.266 689.13 586.707
2014 1915.77 1581.308 -1441.30 -1025.99 -262.59 -294.173 1038.19 952.732
2015 2030.93 1684.556 -1664.16 -1275.217 -138.30 -223.103 1359.09 1223.155
2016 1571.32 1162.721 -1445.96 -1055.557 -460.48 -372.077 896.73 840.892
2017 1187.02 662.608 -1368.13 -1006.765 149.94 240.101 869.01 741.52
Author’s own analysis, based on figures published in Gazprom’s annual reports and IFRS-compliant 
financial statements for the years 2011–17
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annex 4. Debt of Gazprom Group – currency, form of debt and origin 
of capital
currency
amount 
(billions 
of roubles)
form 
of debt
share in total 
debt (%)
origin 
of capital
us dollar
871.106 bonds 26.5 -
106.722 credit 3.2 foreign banks
87.873 credit 2.7 Russian banks
euro
492.76 bonds 15 -
442.508 credit 13.4 foreign banks
171.244 loan 5.2
foreign compa-
nies
67.383 credit 2.0 Russian banks
rouble
204.051 bonds 6.2 -
48.667 credit 1.5 Russian banks
swiss franc 179.203 bonds 5.4 -
pound 
sterling 115.738 bonds 3.5 -
other debt 504.695 various 
forms
15.4 no data available
Author’s own compilation, based on figures published by Gazprom
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annex 5. Debt financing obtained by Gazprom in external markets 
in the years 2014–18
type of financing date amount Interest rate maturity date
Credit agreement with a consortium of 
banks. Banking agent: Kommerzbank AG 
September 
2014
€500 million
EURIBOR 
+0.9%
2016
Bond issue
November 
2014
US$0.7 
billion
4.3% 2015
Loan from Unicredit Bank Austria AG
December 
2014
€390 million
EURIBOR
+2.75%
2015
Credit agreement with the Italian bank 
Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.
January 
2015
€350 million
EURIBOR
+2.75%
2016
Loan from J.P. Morgan Europe Ltd. 
also involving Asian banks
April
2015
US$500 
million
LIBOR
+3.25%
2018
Loan from a consortium of Chinese 
banks. Banking agent: China 
Construction Bank Corporation 
(Beijing branch)
August
2015
US$1.5 
billion
LIBOR 
+3.5%
2020
Eurobonds
October
2015
€1 billion 4.625% 2018
Opening of a credit line by Bank 
of China
March
2016
€2 billion
EURIBOR
+3.5%
2021
Eurobonds 
March
2016
500 million 
Swiss francs
3.375% 2018
Eurobonds
November
2016
€1 billion 3.125% 2023
Eurobonds
November 
2016
500 million 
Swiss francs
2.75% 2021
Loan from Mizuho. SMBC 
and J.P. Morgan
December 
2016
€800 
million
EURIBOR
+2.6%
2020
Loan from a consortium of banks. 
Banking agent: J.P. Morgan Europe Ltd.
February
2017
€800 
million
EURIBOR
+2.6%
2020
Loan from Credit Agricole 
March
2017
€700 million
EURIBOR
+2.5%
2022
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type of financing date amount Interest rate maturity date
Bonds
April
2017
£850 million 4.25% 2024
Bonds
July
2017
500 million 
Swiss francs
2.25% 2022
Loans from companies involved in the 
Nord Stream 2 project
July
2017
Total: €1.62 
billion
- 2035
Eurobonds
November 
2017
€750 million 2.25% 2024
Loan from bank Unicredit S.p.A.
November 
2017
€700 million
EURIBOR
+1.95%
2022
Loan from a consortium of banks. 
Banking agent: J.P. Morgan Europe Ltd. 
November 
2017
€1 billion
EURIBOR
+1.85%
2022
Loan from Unicredit S.p.A. 
January 
2018
€300 million
EURIBOR 
+1.95%
2026
Loans from companies involved in the 
Nord Stream 2 project
March
2018
Total: €404 
million
- 2019
Loan from Credit Agricole May 2018 
€600 
million
EURIBOR
+1.6%
2023 
Loan from Sberbank May 2018 €485 million
EURIBOR
+1.77%
2023 
Author’s own compilation, based on figures published by Gazprom
